shape if I needed external help to identify my own sensations ! ' (1) Secondly, here is A.J. Ayer replying to David Pears in a classic final expression of his answer to Wittgenstein's apparent denial that we can 'identify our sensations ' . Ayer explains what he means by his 'primary recognition', which incorporates the conceptual resources available to his linguist, but the existence of which he takes Wittgenstein to neglect:
The recognition consists in treating whatever it may be as an instance of its kind, as being 'the same' as a previous specimen which, if no label has yet been applied to it, may itself be remembered simply as being, in a more or less shadowy context, the same as this. If the kind has been labelled, the disposition to apply the same label enters into the process of recognition...... (2) Lastly, here is Scott Soames, making it clear that individuals, prior to any acquaintance with a public language acquired in a social setting, have the 'innate' resources enabling them to adequately identify and re-identify colours in their surroundings:
Nothing in the Investigations rules out the possibility that perception provides the agent with representational content. We know that pre-linguistic agents can distinguish different colors.......But if the agent already has something -a part of his visual system -that represents things as being red -then it doesn't seem to be a huge step to suppose that he could introduce something else -a wordwith that same content. (3) In all three cases, it is simply taken for granted that certain 'conceptual resources' are naturally available to the agent, allowing him to attach a name to an object or sensation in isolation from learning a language in a public context. This leads to an infinite regress. Naming ( § 31) in practice is a highly sophisticated procedure that cannot fix meaning on its own, in the absence of 'a great deal of cognitive and contextual stage-setting' (Ibid., 78 et seq.) which must 3 already be presupposed.
On this assessment, Wittgenstein's view would be that Soames's 'representational content' is not 'ruled out' only insofar as this seems such a tempting way for the philosopher to proceed. Wittgenstein is implying, in effect, that what these quoted philosophers are 'tempted to say' is yet another example of something for philosophical treatment ( § 255) , because what they are claiming as philosophers is really parasitic on their prior acquaintance with the public language which they have themselves acquired through the normal process of training central to the account Williams provides of Wittgenstein's methodology. Nevertheless, Wittgenstein is not offering a knockdown argument with his implication that it is only because philosophers stare at these abilities in isolation from the normal contexts in which conceptual resources are acquired, that they allow themselves to arrive at conclusions of this kind. He is instead looking at things in a new light, via a methodology that positively invites a re-examination of the circumstances in which the child in fact learns a public language.
But is that all that he is doing ? For if he is merely drawing our attention to the circumstances in which we in fact acquire a public language, solely in order to remind us that we are deluding ourselves should we become party to the misleading pictures in question, then he is not describing these facts in the course of offering any alternative, positive account of language learning of the kind that Williams evidently believes that she can extract from the textual evidence provided by the Investigations. Indeed, in reminding us in § 6 of the important role that what he calls 'ostensive teaching' is playing in the process of training that will eventually allow the child to actively participate in the normative practice of speaking a language, he stresses that this role is important 'because it is so with human beings; not because it could not be imagined otherwise.' Yet what can be imagined here could surely involve our considering the child as an individual born with precisely these conceptual resources that he could be understood to bring to his understanding of a public language; and this takes us round in a circle.
Certainly, what Wittgenstein can be taken to be indirectly drawing our attention to here is 4 the important role that what we imagine often plays in this particular context, and it is evident that Augustine's child is a classic example of something that we do indeed, and quite unreflectively imagine in the course of considering how a child comes to understand a language. Here it would appear that we almost inevitably regard the child as someone who is conceptually aware prior to his attaching labels to items of the different kinds he naturally encounters in his environment.
Yet it would be difficult not to agree with Williams that the entire point of those early sections of the Investigations is to lead us to see that this is no more than a misleading picture, and that the notion of ostensive teaching is introduced in order to show how this is so easily conflated with ostensive definition, something which in practice requires proper linguistic mastery through training as -at least initially -a form of stimulus-response conditioning. Nevertheless, as Williams puts it, in the course of training the 'child's utterance is treated as a full-fledged judgement or request, as it were, by courtesy', as part of a process in which his 'actions are described only in terms of what is correct or incorrect, appropriate or inappropriate' (Ibid., 80 et seq.), so that those actions, as the child's verbal responses, become part of a normative social practice.
In itself, this may not seem in the least contentious, and it has the appearance of a descriptive account that captures one important facet of those early sections of the Investigations.
What may appear much more contentious is the claim Williams makes that how we learn, as we are initiated into a practice, is constitutive of what we learn (Ibid., 21), a genetic thesis that Williams takes to reflect that blind obedience forming the title of her book. Here we are to think of the training allowing a child to be initiated into the practice of speaking a language, as providing a background of bedrock skills and judgements 'that constitute the hidden medium in which we engage in our various linguistic activities (Ibid.).
To many it will seem even more contentious that on her account, these activities are essentially social, although in claiming this there is no suggestion that the now prevalent idea of a born-Crusoe involves some form of logical contradiction. There is in fact some evidence that Williams is rather inclined in her new book to be at least a little less forceful in promoting this 5 idea in the strident form in which it appears in her earlier presentation:
Genuinely normative practices, that is, practices that are not causally only be what we ourselves in a social context understand corrective behaviour in fact to be:
The dispute between the individualist view and the social view is whether this necessary affinity between ourselves and another is to be explained in terms of the autonomy of grammar which is applicable to individual or community alike; or whether Robinson Crusoe's behaviour must be explained in terms of his nominal membership in our community, that is, his assimilation to our practices. (Ibid., 205).
Williams finally concludes that any attempt to regard the born-Crusoe's behaviour as exhibiting a normative practice faces what she refers to as a trilemma:
Either we give Crusoe nominal membership in our practice (an imaginative exercise only); or we smuggle some form of objectified meaning or interpretation back into the picture (by way, e.g., of a master-pattern); or we are left with mystifying phrases like 'grammar is autonomous'. (Ibid., 209) But here it is arguable that Williams is attempting to provide a philosophical thesis when 6 the evidence actually points in several different directions without implying that we ought to follow any particular path. Indeed, it is not even certain that the path she wishes to follow is directly opposed to the Backer-Hacker line, for on their view, viz., that we can form an innocuous distinction between the genesis and the exercise of an ability, and that it is the exercise of the ability alone that is important, we are perfectly free to imagine born-Crusoes indulging in rule-following behaviour as complex as you please, without in the least worrying how the individual in question comes to acquire the capacity to exhibit it. Wittgenstein in fact draws our attention in § 149 to the idea that knowing the ABC is a state of the mind, an idea which conjures up a mental apparatus, with perhaps a physical correlate in the brain, one that explains the manifestations of that knowledge. Yet despite the fact that there are circumstances in which the search for accounts of this kind can be entirely legitimate, Williams sees Wittgenstein opposing them when they fail to contribute to our understanding of how linguistic competence is manifested in the practice of speaking a language. These accounts are empty insofar as they are irrelevant to what, for example, 'reading' is, so that the attempt to locate reading as a process in the human brain is 'a form of account that is very convincing to us' ( § 158), yet one which goes nowhere in its neglect of the fact that reading is manifested in behaviour.
This for Williams is a pointer to the plain fact, one opposed by those who would argue that what scientific investigations reveal are genuine replacements for our ordinary concepts, that discoveries about the neural correlates of understanding are not discoveries about its real nature, because the scientific investigation is itself parasitic on the ordinary application of the concept. This is a familiar point (Ibid., 153) and leads on to her consideration of the rule-following passages, the second of the three most discussed sections of the Investigations in the secondary literature which she understandably regards as central to our understanding of Wittgenstein.
The long discussion of rule-following which Williams begins in Chapter 5, 'Rules and the Paradox of Interpretation', extends throughout Chapter 6, 'Normativity and the Threat of Regularism', and it is arguable that it does not really reach its final conclusion until the end of Chapter 7, 'Necessity and the Threat of Psychologism', where she adds to stage-setting and the exercise of technique a third dimension that is part of any language-game, the certainty and trust, that which is not 'open to doubt', characteristic of those 'bedrock certainties' to which we are introduced in On Certainty, a work in which she takes the distinction between novice and master to have a highly significant role to play. Her final 'answer' to the rule-following paradox, and to the question she asks at the beginning of Chapter 6, viz., 'What is the "way of grasping a rule which is not an interpretation" (PI § 201) ?' is arguably supplied later in that Chapter:
In sum, to participate in a normative practice is a matter of establishing a second nature by being initiated into pattern-governed behaviour through training in which the cognitive and normative labour is divided between the novice and the master. Grammar is not independent of our lived practices, of our harmonious agreement in action and judgement. But the community is not required in order to police the actions and judgements of all members, but in order to sustain the articulated structure within which understanding and judging can occur and against which error and mistake can be discerned. (Ibid., 219)
In the course of discussing the paradox of rule-following, Williams almost inevitably takes issue with the 'constitutive' view of rule-following she attributes to Saul Kripke. Whilst admitting that the Kripkean viewpoint is not identical with any crude 'majoritarian' claim that 'red' means 'whatever the community says is "red"', it nevertheless collapses as Williams sees it because it is subject to three major criticisms: a) that the paradox of interpretation arises at the level of the community just as it does for the individual; b) that it does not allow for the possibility that the individual can be right whilst the community is wrong, and as such is highly conservative; and c) that it fails to capture our ideas of genuine normativity because the idea of 'going out of step' with fellow-citizens provides merely an illusion that we express and entertain meanings.
Naturally, we can take it that Kripke would hardly be likely to agree with this, so that no matter how 'sceptical' his 'solution' may be in fact, he goes out of his way to indicate that it does capture what we would ordinarily wish to say about the normativity of rule-following: that we automatically calculate new addition problems without feeling any need to check with thesurrounding community, that the community naturally feels entitled to correct rare deviant calculations, and so on. Indeed, the expression of his view that Robinson Crusoe as a radically isolated individual can be thought to follow rules only if we take him into our community and apply our criteria of rule-following to him -since what we understand to be rule-following is presumably manifested in the circumstances in which we apply the term -sounds suspiciously like the account of Crusoe that Williams herself provides. This has the paradoxical consequence that if we do as individuals automatically calculate new addition problems without feeling the need to check with the community, we are already allowing for the possibility that a bright mathematician can as an individual show the community in certain circumstances to be in the wrong provided that the community as a whole can come to see that its calculations in this instance are deviant;
and by what criterion could this be determined other than by its members coming to agree with the mathematician that they had collectively made certain mistakes ? This is reflected in Kripke's final claim, one which has at least the appearance of being rather disingenuous, viz., that what follows from these considerations is not after all that the answers provided by the community to addition problems are by definition correct, but just that if, platitudinously, everyone agrees on a certain answer -including in this case our bright mathematician -then undoubtedly no one will feel in the least justified in calling that answer wrong. (5) The criticisms which Williams makes of the Baker and Hacker 'individualist' standpoint fall into a different category. Agreeing that many of their outbursts against Kripke's version of the community view strike home, she nevertheless regards their tendency to emphasise the exercise of an ability at the expense of its genesis, as a way of reading the adult back into the child in the way expressed by Augustine's picture of learning. Indeed, by treating the relation between concept or rule and behavioural regularity and training as external, she claims that they fail even to allow that a natural born child could become a user of language (Ibid., 181), because their presentation leaves us with the impression that these capacities are already native to the new-born child. This Yet if we take the claim that grammar is autonomous not as some kind of philosophical superlative, but as a reminder of 'how we go on' which is not answerable to anything but itself, then we gain a clearer perspective of how it accurately represents Wittgenstein's approach even through the distorting lens of a rather theoretical presentation. If to begin with the concept of the born-Crusoe is understood to be representative of the meaning-determinism rejected by Kripke, a rejection which leads to the associated rule-following paradox because anything one does at this point can be in accord with the rule, then we gain a superior vantage point from which to understand Wittgenstein's approach if we see these as two opposing poles, each of which provides a source of philosophical misunderstanding in relation to the circumstances in which we in fact acquire and employ a language.
So how does Wittgenstein's approach differ from Kripke's ? Wittgenstein's paradox results from staring at the ordinary application of a rule in isolation from its context in those practical affairs in which it finds its normal expression, just as, and at the other extreme the concept of the 13 14 born-Crusoe takes the exercise of the rule to be pre-determined (the Kripkean meaning-determinist picture) by Crusoe's possession of a capacity operating in isolation from the social background against which we come in fact to understand both how it is acquired and how it manifests itself in practice. Yet in the philosophical attempt to abandon this Platonist picture of the born-Crusoe who magically encompasses within himself the capacity required to master a rule in its infinite number of applications, the temptation is to retreat to a single point in time. But this leaves one with the problem of having to decide to go in one direction rather than another as a way of interpreting the rule, when anything that one does can then be understood to be in accord with it. One then becomes victim to the rule-following paradox, because what one has to do at this point has the character of making a stab in the dark. possibly be getting at in suggesting that it is not possible that there be only a single occasion of rule-following, is no more than a reminder that if we insist when doing philosophy on taking our understanding of what it is to follow a rule out of its ordinary context within the framework of shared -and on occasion unshared -responses in which we obey rules and go against them, then the sceptical paradox will be unanswerable. Indeed, it is unanswerable on Wittgenstein's assessment if we insist on staring at the picture in which it seems that we can give 'one interpretation after another', almost as if 'each one contented us for a moment, until we thought of yet another standing behind it.' ( § 201) The way forward lies in turning our eyes away from the picture, for if we fail to do so then we will in this philosophical context be caught in a classically insoluble dilemma, continually oscillating between the adherence to an unacceptable concept of a Platonist born-Crusoe at one extreme, and the retreat to a point in time at which one has to make a stab in the dark in the course of following no-rule at-all at the other.
The idea, therefore, that one should require a solution to the paradox rests on the false premise that Wittgenstein could grant to the meaning-determinist picture the role in our thinking that would make mandatory the search for one. Wittgenstein's appeal to the circumstances in which we in fact follow a rule is not intended to provide an answer to a 'sceptical paradox', when it is quite clear that adherence to a misleading picture cannot allow of the kind of answer a philosophical solution to the paradox would appear to require. The idea of training into a practice instead provides a new way of countering the born-Crusoe -by drawing our eyes away from the picture -just as a call to return to the contexts in which a rule is actually applied ( § 198 and § 201) reveals how easy it is for the philosopher to become victim to a picture he finds it impossible to relinquish. This is a minimalist assessment of the rule-following passages which would obviate the Believing with certainty is unavoidable and should not be mistaken for our being irrational or gullible. We cannot be anything but subject to norms including Wittgensteinian certainties. The alternative is literally death or madness. Becoming subject to norms and certainties in initiate learning is to depend on, and thereby trust, the support of others within the community. As we have already seen, this is not just a matter of the child's biological weakness, but, even more importantly, of her cognitive and psychological dependence. So, how we come to accept background certainties reveals much about the ways in which they are held. Exemplary judgements are precisely of the sort that are explicitly used in teaching children language. (Ibid., 255)
This passage occurs in her discussion of On Certainty, and as examples of those judgements, she offers 'that's a zebra' or 'that's a towel'. In this context these are intended to be examples where 'mistake is not possible, doubt cannot be entertained, and evidence is not required' (Ibid., 254). This is not the kind of context in which 'that's a zebra' is uttered with reference to an animal a quarter of a mile away that might turn out on closer inspection to be a horse, or in which 'that's a towel' refers to something at the far end of the garden which might a la Austin turn out on getting a closer look to be a pillowslip. Nevertheless, it would be wrong to conclude that those judgements 'that look like ordinary empirical claims but are not' (Ibid.)
should be construed either as framework propositions -setting a priori constraints on what moves can be made within the game -or as foundational propositions -providing the epistemic base for moves within it (Ibid., 259). Williams importantly draws the conclusion that the hinge analogy used to capture the certainty to which Wittgenstein is referring, is in the final analysis more the expression of an attitude which is tied to the notion of a form of life, thereby severing any connection which might wrongly ally it to the concept of knowledge. predicate, what is actually intended to constitute the fundamental source of the diarist's semantic normativity (the 'private ostensive defintion') collapses at the first hurdle because it is clear that no standard in these circumstances can possibly be set to begin with. Here we are being presented with a picture in which we are invited to think of the private diarist as a 'self' who experiences a sensation which has no qualitative characteristics whatsoever, no 'qualitative feel', so it is hardly surprising that no standard of comparison can be set which would allow for 're-identification' of the sensation on any of its supposed future appearances. In short, if we were to think of this sensation as enjoying the 'qualitative feel' referred to, as having Soames's representational content, then for Williams it must follow that the language used in 'referring' to it would be a public language, because the sensation term would then have a proper place in a practice providing the stage-setting allowing a diarist to become freed from the consequences of an isolation in which no normative distinction between 'seems right' and 'is right' could be made (Ibid., 276). On the view advocated by Williams, this supposed incommunicability of the private diarist's sensation terms is no loss to the 'Cartesian', who mistakenly believes that the peculiar content of the name-named relation can be upheld because he fails to realise that his belief in privileged epistemic access results from conflating the ordinary, yet wholly different roles that we allocate to names and descriptions.
In reminding us that the 'naming' of the private diarist exploits a concept of a simple object that goes back to the Tractatus, Williams allows for a reading of the private language passages that sidesteps a great many of the historical criticisms of that argument relying on the premise that since we do and can 'identify our sensations privately' in some generally acceptable Yet in § 288 of the Investigations, the claim that ordinary first person sensation-ascription is criterionless is tied to the idea that our ordinary sensations are not private objects, so that we do not require criteria in order to talk of a sensation which is the same as one previously experienced. This is a claim about our public language of sensations in which we do require third person behavioural criteria for talking about our sensations. Wittgenstein distinguishes clearly between this case of first person sensation-ascription in which 'the expression of doubt has no place in the language-game', and the case of a wholly private language as envisioned in § 258 in which, because its use is isolated in principle from human behaviour, the private diarist might legitimately begin to doubt afresh.
But in what could this doubt conceivably consist ? The answer lies precisely in the point that by definition the diarist now requires criteria for identifying his sensation as a private object. In these new circumstances criteria would serve to identify it as the same individual private object as one previously experienced. But in ordinary first person sensation-ascription there is nothing that could count as 'identifying and reidentifying a sensation according to criteria', because we do not identify our sensations as objects at all. The (misleading) model in operation here pictures 'private objects', of which there can be more than one of one kind, appearing and disappearing in some semblance of a mock three-dimensional continuum, a model whose manifest absurdity is something on which Wittgenstein relies when he hints that it cannot properly represent our ordinary sensation talk.
This need not be assumed to be inconsistent with Williams's general point that true subjective names can only name subjective simples. These ontologically subjective simples are what Williams calls 'seemings'. Since the metaphysical characteristic of those seemings is that they indescribable, (Ibid., 277, and 310 Footnote 10), this does tend to support her general claim that because the activity of the private diarist is intended to occur independently of any linguistic mastery as ordinarily understood -otherwise the sign referred to in § 258 will not be a sign with a meaning private and incommunicable to others -then to allow a diarist to talk freely of his sensations and their recurrence is already to assume that he has in fact acquired linguistic mastery against a community background.
This background supplies the stage-setting in which his first person criterionless sensation-ascriptions allow him to make the distinction between 'seems right' and 'is right', a setting denied by definition to the private diarist who is effectively barred from identifying and re-identifying his sensations at all.
But this merely serves to remind us that those well-known private-language passages incorporate the notion of a private object so defined by Wittgenstein that it beggars belief that Descartes and his successors could ever have become party to it. This surely throws doubt on the supposed historical consequences often thought to follow from the 'private language argument', for in the version envisaged by Williams, which is on the whole highly instructive, it must lead us to reflect on the historical fact that the British empiricists, whether in their 17th, 18th, 19th or 20th century guises, began with the idea that our sensations could confer meaning quite independently of our aquaintance with the public language in which we in fact talk about them.
It matters little whether any chosen philosopher is believed to have adhered to an 'imagist' theory of meaning (Locke probably yes, Ayer as quoted apparently no). The important point is that the Wittgensteinian response to these philosophers does not, and cannot lie in his supplying a reductio argument revealing that their presuppositions involve some form of hidden internal contradiction.
On the contrary, the more common reactions to the private language argument are illustrated via the three philosophers already quoted, viz., Kripke, Ayer and Soames, and Wittgenstein provides them with an entirely methodological response, one which consists in the challenge that their failure to renounce a misleading picture results in a natural tendency to stare at first-person sensation-ascription in isolation from its normal surroundings of application.
Williams's appeal to the simples of the Tractatus, together with this idea of staring at our abilities in isolation from the circumstances in which they are both generated and manifested, serve to play an important role in her continuing assessment of Wittgenstein on privacy. In her account of the notoriously difficult § 265, which both Fogelin (Ibid., 279 and 311, Footnote 11) and
Ayer famously in 'Can There be a Private Language ?' understood to be questioning the viability of memory, Williams turns this interpretation on its head by once again presenting Wittgenstein as arguing, not that whilst there is a genuine meaning to remember, we are far from justified in relying on our capacity to remember what this meaning is, but that since there is no meaning generated to 21 22 begin with, there is nothing that one could conceivably claim to remember. The notion of a final independent check allowing one to literally see the timetable is central to the argument, and since reliance on memory alone will always be very much a subjective second best in these kinds of circumstances to this final objective form of confirmation -as it would be, for example in a court of law -the unsupported reliance on memory alone cannot in principle serve as a proper foundation for generating meaning. § § 261 -264 which question the idea of providing a private definition of a word in the absence of a proper technique of using it, make essentially the same point.
This point is also central to § 380, and how one recognises that this is red, where the temptation to look for a justification via private ostensive definition is explicitly shown to be empty. Yet in § 384, and more clearly in § 381, it would be an answer to say that I know this colour is red -so that I also know when to say that I am seeing red again (Cf. § 258) -not because in this case my utterance is subject to public check, but because 'I have learnt English', in which event there is a recognised technique of using the term 'red' and therefore in this case no genuinely recognising that this is red at all, because first person sensation-ascription is criterionless.
Williams uses § 56 to throw light on § 265, and it is interesting to note that her reference to 'the futile search for that which could secure the "meaning" or content allegedly found in the baptismal object itself' (Ibid., 281) has all the appearance of capturing Soames's initial baptism of a colour which does indeed contain the representational content whose existence she takes Wittgenstein to deny in the private case. But what Soames is referring to is not the private case as conceived by Wittgenstein, but our natural tendency to say that we know that this colour is red because it transparently presents itself meaningfully to us as red. Yet our tendency to say this when doing philosophy exists in isolation from the important fact that what fundamentally allows us to say it at all is that we 'have learnt English'. Once again Wittgenstein's methodology allows him to issue a reminder of the circumstances in which we in fact learn how to use sensation-terms.
Just as she allows § 56 to throw light on § 265, Williams uses § 50 to throw light on § 293, which she understands to be questioning the ontological subjectivity of sensations in the way that of unpacking if it is understood to be stating more than the obvious -although the important point she wishes to stress is that § 293 involves Wittgenstein's treatment of a view in which experiences are communicable insofar as there is a shared public language of sensation, yet in which reference to a private subjective entity remains a feature of this particular language-game (Ibid., 286 and 311, and Footnote 14). Whilst this is also open to question insofar as Wittgenstein asks only halfway through the passage what it would mean if we were to suppose that the word 'beetle' had a use in these people's language, the implication being that this is not part of the original thought experiment, he then goes on to make his well-known point that on the model of 'object and designation', the object drops out of consideration as irrelevant. is detailed and thorough, drawing attention to the consequences of the private language passages, to Wittgenstein's use of the novice-master distincton in the context of training into a linguistic practice, and to the fundamental claim that 'sensation cannot be disassociated from the reactive context in which experience is embedded' (Ibid., 291), it is also arguable that as an account of Wittgenstein's direct confrontation with those and similar thought experiments it is unnecessarily convoluted. By contrast, Wittgenstein's own discussions combine simplicity with profundity.
The directness of his approach to these and similar proposals is so startling that it can be only too easily bypassed or dismissed as irrelevant, yet in all cases it concerns our willingness to become victim to the stranglehold of a picture that, whilst it may accompany our practice, we are unwittingly we to reply that 'he's quite right' ? (Zettel, § 396). This sequence of examples is followed shortly after by the question whether the verb 'to dream' has a present tense ( § 399), and the fact that it has no first person present tense application points towards the conclusion that the natural tendency to attempt to make philosophical capital out of the 'plain fact' that the content of our experiences whether dreaming or awake can often appear to be qualitatively indistinguishable, is to sever our concept of dreaming from the surrounding circumstances in which we ordinarily have occasion to recount our dreams.
The certainty accompanying our possession of consciousness is provided with a similar kind of treatment. One classic example is Zettel § 402, where the conviction accompanying this certainty is regarded as a mighty force whose point of application does not move, so no work is being done with it. We are also told that a man can pretend to be unconscious. But what might it mean to say that he can pretend to be conscious ? (Zettel, § 395). Another classic example is
Investigtions § 419, where we are invited to consider the circumstances in which we would say that a tribe has a chief, and surely the chief must have consciousness ? This proposal, of course, is a joke, which turns on the point that if we insist on becoming party to the picture in which consciousness is regarded as an accompaniment to behaviour, then we are halfway to realising the notion of the zombie that enjoys no conscious experiences 'behind' its outward facade. But this is to attempt to provide the concept with a bogus application (Cf. § § 422 -425) in which it becomes severed from the surrounding circumstances in which we say that people are either conscious or unconscious depending on whether they are, say, awake or asleep, fighting in the boxing ring or 'out for the count'.
The point is expanded into § 420, quoted by Williams when she claims that the moral 26 impact of refusing to see pain in the child's weeping is to treat the child as a machine (Ibid., 302 and 312 Footnote 27). Whilst this is said in a context in which behaviour can be the expression of a psychological state only if it is constitutive of that state, with the implication that it is a serious error to think of the sensation of pain as no more than a accompaniment of the child's behaviour, as distinct from something manifested in the public arena as pain-behaviour, it does not follow that any refusal to acknowledge the pain in a child's weeping is literally to treat it as a machine. After all, when we read in our histories that men, women and children were put to the sword, we would find it hard to conclude that those who indulged in this kind of slaughter were always under the misapprehension that they were only killing zombies. On the contrary, our ordinary understanding would be that they were morally indifferent to the suffering of their enemies.
Wittgenstein's point in § 420, on the other hand, is just that the difficulty he naturally encounters in regarding the people around him in quite ordinary circumstances as pure automata, as beings without consciousness -and he does not say that this picture is senseless -results in his having to think of them as wandering about in a trance, in a state of stupefaction -the kind of state we might normally associate with being under the influence of a hallucinatory drug -in order to make this proposal remotely believable. Thinking of them as being in a trance-like state is therefore the closest we can come to envisaging the kind of criteria which would allow the concept of a zombie to have any kind of ordinary, as distinct from a bogus philosophical 'application'.
It is primarily to examples of this kind that we can legitimately apply Wittgenstein's claim in § 116 that he is bringing words back from their metaphysical to their everyday use. In his reference to the philosopher's attempts to grasp the essence of the thing, the essence, for example, of dreaming or of consciousness, he is pointing towards his alternative method of rooting out the misleading picture that may certainly accompany the practice of talking about our dreams or about when we are or are not conscious. But the philosopher exhibits the tendency to take the meaning of the concepts of dreaming or consciousness to consist in his attempt to apply the picture, and it is in the nature of this 'application' that it should be attempted in complete isolation from the ordinary circumstances in which the relevant 27 concepts are actually used. Gordon Baker is surely justified in his scathing reference to a common understanding of 'everyday use' in this passage as referring to nothing more than 'the standard speech-patterns of the English-speaking peoples', for this makes it look as if the wayward philosopher is attempting to give the relevant words a 'metaphysical use' by in some way breaching the limits set by these speech-patterns, when it may not be at all clear just what it is that he is doing wrong. (7) Williams draws her chapter on 'The Paradox of Consciousness' to a close with a look at those contexts in which we would justifiably distinguish between circumstances in which human behaviour might be taken as evidence for a psychological ascription, as distinct from the primary cases which ultimately grant evidence-based claims with their sense: we normally see the pain, grief, or joy of another, as she puts it, without inference (Ibid., 305) . Quoting the famous nurse This structuring she understands to allow for a specific answer to the textual question why the famous metaphilosophical remarks occur where they do, the kind of answer which she believes that neither the wholly constructivist nor the wholly quietist interpreter is remotely able to provide.
The importance that Williams attaches to the distinction between master and novice in the process of initiate learning is reflected in the fact that every major problem and line of argument that given to wonder whether it is not attempting too much, or whether a certain section has not been inserted in the wrong place, e.g., the treatment of Davidson and Brandom from 160 onwards that may to some readers irritatingly interrupt rather than clarify the discussion of following a rule.
One virtue of the earlier volume is that because it comprises a selection of largely self-contained essays devoted to individual topics which throw light on each other, it does not give the impression that too much is being crowded into the available space. The final sections of the mostly outstanding chapter on the paradoxes of consciousness have the appearance of being rather rushed, and they do not 30 consequently deal with the questions raised in the detail or with the flair they genuinely require, so that they do not seem to cohere with the rest of this chapter as one might wish. In addition, each chapter has extensive footnotes -amounting in Chapter 5 to 82 in number -many of which serve to elaborate on points raised in the main text; and whilst this is without doubt a sign of a fertile mind, it raises the obvious question whether a sustained effort to condense a lot of the material in the book might not have helped its organisation and the clarification of its overall goals.
These matters, however, are largely aesthetic, and it would be unfair to end on a churlish note. They do not ultimately bear on the fact that the level of philosophical acumen displayed in this volume enables it to stand above a great deal of what is being published today in what has become a vast secondary literature on Wittgenstein that continues to be added to month by month. Certainly, this literature as a consequence of its sheer volume is becoming ever more difficult to properly survey and assess, so that even the best of it often fails to attract the readership that it deserves. It is all the more important, therefore, that attention be directed towards those works that do add substantially to our understanding of Wittgenstein or, which is often more important, which raise fundamental questions about the nature of his contribution to philosophy. It would not be inappropriate to claim that this new volume succeeds on both counts.
